An RSA modulus is a product M = pl of two primes p and l. We show that for almost all RSA moduli M , the number of sparse exponents e (which allow for fast RSA encryption) with the property that gcd(e, ϕ(M )) = 1 (hence RSA decryption can also be performed) is very close to the expected value.
Introduction
Let M be an integer, and let ϕ(M) denote the Euler function.
We recall that given an integer e with gcd(e, ϕ(M)) = 1, one round of the RSA encryption of a message x ∈ [0, M − 1] consists of the modular exponentiation x e ≡ y (mod M), which produces an encrypted message y ∈ [0, M − 1]. Because gcd(e, ϕ(M)) = 1, if the factorization of M is known (hence the value of ϕ(M) can be computed), one can find an integer d with ed ≡ 1 (mod ϕ(M)).
The decryption then consists of the modular exponentiation
In this paper, we estimate the number of sparse exponents e, which support fast modular exponentiation x e (mod M) and therefore speed-up RSA encryption, that also satisfy the condition gcd(e, ϕ(M)) = 1.
It is often recommended to select the encryption (or decryption) exponent in the RSA algorithm as a sparse integer (with say at most k non-zero binary digits); see Section 14.6.1 of [12] . If e is an n-bit integer with only k non-zero binary digits, then the computation of x e (mod M) by repeated squaring requires n + k modular multiplications, while for an arbitrary n-bit integer it is about 2n operations in the worst case and about 1.5n operations "on average". However, since we also require the condition gcd(e, ϕ(M)) = 1 for decryption, it is not clear how many such exponents are available. We remark that despite the existence of faster exponentiation methods, repeated squaring still remains one of the most commonly used in practice. In any case, studying the properties of sparse integers is a very natural number theoretic question.
To be more precise, let us denote by N n,k (M) the set of e ∈ [1, 2 n − 1] with exactly k non-zero binary digits and such that gcd(e, ϕ(M)) = 1. We will show that the cardinality N n,k (M) of N n,k (M) is close to its expected value
when M runs through the set of RSA moduli M = pl, where p and l are two prime numbers. We remark that for an even m there are ϕ(m) integers x ∈ [0, m/2 − 1] for which gcd(2x + 1, m) = 1, thus the density of such
Throughout the paper, P denotes the set of primes; log z and ln z denote the binary and natural logarithms of z > 0, respectively.
Counting Sparse Encryption Exponents
For an integer n, we denote by R n the set of n-bit integers that are products of two primes, that is,
Let us consider the sum
Theorem. For any k and n with k ≤ (n + 1)/2, the bound
holds for some absolute constant c > 0. 
where T n,k (m) is the number of e ∈ [1, 2 n − 1] with exactly k non-zero binary digits and such that e ≡ 0 (mod m). If m is odd, it is easily seen that (2) where T * n,k (m) is the number of e ∈ [2 n−1 , 2 n − 1] with exactly k non-zero binary digits and such that e ≡ 0 (mod m).
By Theorem 2 of [10] , there exist absolute constants c 1 , c 2 > 0 such that
uniformly for m ≤ K, where K = exp(c 2 k 1/2 ). For any such m, we have
To estimate T * n,k (m) for larger values of m, we remark that if m lies in the range 2 s ≤ m ≤ 2 s+1 − 1 and if m|e, then those bits of e in the rightmost s positions are uniquely determined by the bits in the leftmost n−s positions. Since the first bit of e is 1, we have
For any integer s ≥ 0, we have the bound
If 2k ≤ n − s + 1, we have a better estimate
Because 1 − z ≤ exp(−z) for any z ≥ 0, we obtain
Using this inequality and defining
we obtain
Note that ϑ < 1 since 2(k − 1) ≤ (n − 1). Now we consider two separate cases. First, suppose that K < 2 n−2k+1 , and put L = 2 n−2k+1 . We use the bound (3) for m ≤ K, the bound (5) for K < m ≤ L, and the bound (4) for m > L. Therefore, from (2) we derive
Since ϑ < 1, one can extend the first summation to include all odd divisors of ϕ(M) with the same error term. Because ϕ(M) is even we have
Using the well known identity
which follows from the inclusion-exclusion principle (see also Theorem 2.1 of Chapter 2 of [13]), we obtain
Hence,
, where τ (r) denotes the number of integer divisors of r ≥ 2. As before we have
Therefore,
where c 3 > 0 is an absolute constant. Next we turn to the case K ≥ 2 n−2k+1 . We use the bound (3) for m ≤ K, and the bound (4) for m > K. Proceeding as before, we obtain in this case
It follows from Lemma 8 of [11] that
where
Note that H(α) is strictly increasing for 0 < α < 1/2, as is easily verified. For 0 < δ < 1
Taking into account that ln(1 ± δ) = O(δ) we obtain
From the condition on K we derive the inequality 1
and we obtain
for some absolute constant c 4 > 0. Therefore for any k ≤ (n + 1)/2 we have
for some absolute constant c 5 > 0.
To complete the proof, recall that τ (rs) ≤ τ (r)τ (s) for integers r, s ≥ 1. Consequently
From Theorem 7.1 of [13] we have l≤L l∈P
.
From the prime number theorem, one easily derives that |R n | ≥ c 6 2 n n −2 for some absolute constant c 6 > 0, and the result follows.
⊓ ⊔ In particular, we see that for any 1/3 > ε > 0 and k ∼ n 2/3+ε the bound
holds for almost all M ∈ R n .
Remarks
Let t, s be nonzero integers and n = st. We think of the binary representation of an n bit number as a sequence of t blocks of s bits each. Let N n,k,t (M) be the set of e ∈ [1, 2 n − 1] with exactly k non-zero bit blocks and such that gcd(e, ϕ(M)) = 1. Let N n,k,t (M) denote the cardinality of N n,k,t (M). Is it true that
when M runs through the set of RSA moduli M = pl, where p and l are two primes? Note that the case s = 1 reduces to what has already been shown. The motivation for the problem comes from the fact that in order to speed up exponentiation one sometimes uses the window method (see Algorithm 14.82 of [12] ). Here, rather than "sparse" RSA exponents one is interested in using "block sparse" RSA exponents.
It is known [1, 2, 3, 14, 15] that if some information about the bits of the decryption exponent d is available then the corresponding encryption is vulnerable to various attacks. Thus it will be very important to show that the set of d defined by (1) for e ∈ N n,k (M) is uniformly distributed modulo ϕ(M). Although we hope that the method of [6] combined with the Hua Loo Keng method of estimating of exponential sums can be applied to this problem, so far there have been several obstacles that we have not been able to overcome.
On the other hand, there does exist a slightly different set of encryption exponents that also admit fast modular exponentiation (because they are small) and for which the corresponding set of decryption exponents can be shown to be uniformly distributed. The result is based on a recent estimate of a double exponential sum from [7, 8, 9 ]; see also [5] . To be more specific, it follows from Theorem 2 of [7] than for any ε > 0, there exists a constant c(ε) > 0 that for X = exp c(ε)(log M)
2/3+ε
the inverses modulo ϕ(M) of the elements E = {e = pl : p, l ∈ P, X ≤ p < l ≤ 2X, gcd(pl, ϕ(M)) = 1}
are uniformly distributed modulo ϕ(M). For any e ∈ E, the exponentiation x e ≡ (x p ) l (mod M) requires only O (log M) 2/3+ε modular multiplications, which is much smaller than what is required for a general exponent. On the other hand, since the corresponding decryption exponents are uniformly distributed, it is very unlikely that they will possess any special properties that make them vulnerable to attacks similar to those described in [1, 2, 3, 14, 15] .
Finally, it is easy to derive from Theorem 3.1 of [4] that for all integer M ∈ [2 n−1 , 2 n − 1], except maybe o(2 n ) of them the bound τ (ϕ(M)) ≤ 2 (0.5+o(1)) ln 2 ln M holds. Using this bound one can show that N n,k (M) is close to its expected value for almost all integer M ∈ [2 n−1 , 2 n − 1] (rather than just for almost all M ∈ R n ).
